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Despite being amongst the largest recipients 
of foreign aid, conflict-affected countries have 
often failed to achieve significant medium- 
or long-term developmental outcomes. Aid 
has often been allocated to irrelevant, non-
developmental projects, which have proven 
unsustainable in the face of conflict or have 
disappeared at the hands of the recipient 
countries or the donor agencies – as we will 
see in this paper’s case study. At worst, aid 
has in some cases resulted in the prolonging 
or deepening of conflict1. Donors’ current 
areas of focus, including institution building, 
governance and judicial reforms, democracy 
promotion, and private sector development, 
though potentially valuable under ‘normal’ 
circumstances, are unlikely to contribute to 
the economic revival of a conflict-affected 
economy. Moreover, it is estimated that up 
to 60 per cent of the total aid money allo-
cated to each programme or project ends up 
staying in the donor country itself to cover 
‘donor expenses’ (Europa 2005). 
This contradictory relationship between 
high levels of aid and the ineffectiveness of 
such flows implies that higher quantities 
of aid are not necessarily an answer to ail-
ing conflict economies. Furthermore, this 
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contradiction signals the mismatch between 
the economic needs of a conflict-affected 
country and the nature of donor programmes 
devised for that country. This paper argues 
that this mismatch originates from the 
donors’ lack of understanding of the interac-
tion between conflict and the socio-economic 
structures of a country, and the ways in which 
this interaction alters the latter’s develop-
ment needs, priorities, and policy options. 
A political economy study of aid as a ‘devel-
opment instrument’ shows that donors’ fail-
ure to effectively incorporate conflict into 
their frameworks and approaches is due to 
two major factors: first, the inability of the 
neoclassical macroeconomic framework 
embraced by most donors to incorporate a 
comprehensive analysis of conflict econo-
mies within its confined boundaries and 
assumptions; and second, the unwillingness 
of donors to take effective account of the 
conflict stemming from their political, stra-
tegic and ideological interests and alliances 
in the conflict. To demonstrate the above, 
this paper examines the nature of donor 
operations in the occupied Palestinian ter-
ritories (oPt) in the period prior to (1994–
2000) and immediately after (2000–2006) 
the second Intifada of 2000. The second 
Intifada is chosen as a point of heightened 
intensity of conflict, which provides a needed 
threshold for an analysis of the changes to 
donor behaviour and allocation patterns in 
response to an outbreak or intensification of 
conflict. Through this, the paper highlights 
the political and ideological determinants 
of donor aid policies, and the ways in which 
their aid is often structured ‘around’ the con-
flict as opposed to taking account of it. The 
paper argues that aid to the oPt cannot bring 
about significant socio-economic develop-
ment as long as it does not confront Israel’s 
policies of occupation, which affect every 
sphere of social, economic and political life 
in the Palestinian territories. Furthermore, it 
argues that apart from the lack of political 
will on the part of donors to constructively 
engage with the conflict, the aid policies 
and frameworks that they deploy in conflict 
zones are not able to fully understand and 
address the issue of development under con-
flict. This is demonstrated most clearly by an 
analysis of donor activities in the oPt in the 
period before and immediately after the year 
2000, showing that the share of develop-
ment assistance dropped from 88 per cent 
of total international aid before the Intifada 
to only 26 per cent after 2000. The donors’ 
post-Intifada focus on governance and insti-
tutional reforms, the paper argues, is an 
indication of their (theoretical) inability and 
(political) unwillingness to engage with ‘con-
flict’ – which in turn gives rise to assistance 
programmes which ‘work around the con-
flict’ that fulfil the donors’ desire to maintain 
a presence in one of the most important geo-
political conflicts in the world.
Aid Effectiveness Debate
Recent decades have witnessed a surge in 
international aid flows. These flows, particu-
larly when channelled to conflict-affected 
countries, have been not only assigned the 
task of post-conflict reconstruction but also 
the more ambitious task of ending the con-
flict by creating socio-economic conditions 
conducive to peace. For example, referring 
to its 1993 white paper on economic devel-
opment in the occupied Palestinian territory 
(oPt), Developing the Occupied Territories: 
An Investment in Peace, the World Bank 
announced ‘how often does it happen that 
world peace depends on an economic devel-
opment program’ (World Bank 1993). This 
perspective has, in turn, left much space for 
donor policy-conditionality aimed at devis-
ing policies in the recipient country osten-
sibly essential not only for post-conflict 
reconstruction but also to help end the con-
flict itself. 
The ‘Aid Effectiveness Debate,’ as it has 
come to be known since the latter half of the 
1990s, centres on the role of aid in economic 
development and emerged in response to the 
growing discontent with the ‘achievements’ 
of aid in developing countries. In the 1960s, 
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the impact of aid on growth was seen as 
straightforward: a lump-sum addition to the 
capital stock of the recipient economy lead-
ing to higher levels of savings, investment 
and growth.2 Apart from ignoring the risks 
of aid dependency, this view also assumed 
that low investment levels are simply due to 
lack of savings and capital. Indeed large for-
eign capital inflows may negatively impact 
the levels of domestic savings by reducing 
the incentive to save, for both households 
and the government.3 According to Griffin 
et al. (1970), aid could negatively impact a 
government’s tax revenues or change the 
composition of its expenditure thus becom-
ing a ‘substitute’ for saving. In addition, the 
increase in foreign private capital flows that 
follows increased levels of foreign assistance 
reduces the profit rates of domestic inves-
tors, reducing their private saving rates and 
frustrating the emergence of an indigenous 
entrepreneurial class. In addition, the con-
ditions attached to aid undermined the 
national sovereignty of the recipient country, 
as well as straining its economic resources 
and developmental priorities.4 
Mounting concerns over the apparent 
failure of aid to deliver development and 
the inability of the dominant frameworks 
to explain the reasons behind it resulted in 
a major shift in the aid debate in the 1990s. 
The parallel rise of the neo-liberal economic 
framework and the ambitious expansion 
of its analytical framework to the realms of 
governance and institution building set the 
tone for the new aid debate. According to 
the neoclassical framework, the workings of 
aid was dependent on a host of ‘other’ fac-
tors Initially defined in environmental and 
geographical terms, they soon expanded 
to include institutions, policies and forms 
of governance of the recipient country. The 
new debate, led most prominently by Boone 
(1994, 1995) and Burnside and Dollar (1997, 
2000), argued that the ineffectiveness of aid 
is due to the failure of the recipient govern-
ments to create the right policy environ-
ment. By arguing that ‘bad policies’ of the 
state are responsible for the ineffectiveness 
of foreign aid, the debate called for more 
policy conditions that would bring about 
the desired ‘good governance’ and ‘good 
policies’ required to enhance the effective-
ness of foreign aid and stimulate growth in 
the recipient country.5 A number of indica-
tors and measures, including low inflation, 
high exports and imports, and small budget 
deficits were recommended. However, the 
definitions of ‘good policy’ and ‘good gov-
ernance’ were vague and broad enough to 
allow donors to develop a ‘new chapter of 
conditionality’ (Doornbos 2001: 97) aimed 
at encouraging policies conducive to the 
long-term dominance of market forces and 
private actors in the economy. This approach 
has formed the basis of many of the aid pro-
grammes and policies of multilateral and 
bilateral donors since the late 1990s. 
The relatively small body of critique which 
emerged in the following years,6 focused 
primarily on the methodological and sam-
ple-related weaknesses in the Burnside 
and Dollar-type analyses. Many of these 
studies, however, did not depart from the 
latter’s quantitative framework, left many 
of the neoclassical assumptions about the 
role and workings of aid unquestioned, and 
made no viable attempts to incorporate 
the internal and external political economy 
and conflict-related factors. Due to these 
shortcomings most current debates do not 
enable a full analysis of the workings of aid 
in conflict zones. 
One of the major assumptions underlying 
much of the debate is that economic institu-
tions and policies are the main determinants 
of long-term economic growth – a theo-
retically weak and empirically unrealistic 
assumption. This is particularly true in the 
case of conflict-affected countries where the 
existence of well-functioning state institu-
tions is important but insufficient for suc-
cessful economic performance. Numerous 
conflict-related forces dominate the cur-
rent and future growth and development 
prospects of conflict-affected economies. 
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Assumptions of competitive factor mar-
kets, perfect credit markets, no exogenous 
technical progress and constant population 
growth, which underlie much of the aid liter-
ature, are largely irrelevant to most develop-
ing economies experiencing conflict where 
the functioning of markets are subject to 
substantial disruptions as a direct (e.g. physi-
cal destruction) or indirect (e.g. increased 
risk and uncertainty) result of conflict. For 
example, it is irrelevant to assume competi-
tive factor markets in the oPt where exports 
and imports, as well as internal markets, are 
subject to restrictive measures imposed by 
the Government of Israel (GoI) that reduce 
the competitiveness of these markets.
In addition, although the recent aid debate 
discusses inherently political variables such 
as governance reforms, it calls for a depolitici-
sation of the development process (Taghdisi-
Rad 2011). While the debate endorses 
channelling more aid towards government 
reforms and budgets, it simultaneously calls 
for a reduction in the size of the government 
(in line with neoliberal economic thought). 
The ‘apolitical’ image that donors would like 
to project also does not sit well with their 
direct involvement in creating the politi-
cal and institutional structures of recipient 
economies. The ‘universality’ and ‘one-fits-all’ 
approach attached by multilateral donors to 
good governance measures and policies has 
not only undermined the role of the state 
and the recipient country’s ownership of 
the development process, but also replaced 
country-specific policies with inconsist-
ent and vague universal ‘values’ (Doornbos 
2001). An incomplete and partial democra-
tisation and economic liberalisation accord-
ing to ‘universal’ values can in fact increase 
the risk of further conflict by undermining 
the country’s institutions and political and 
development priorities. 
Aid and Conflict
Rather than taking the conflict and its inter-
action with the socio-economic structures of 
the country as the starting point of an analy-
sis of the workings of foreign aid in conflict 
regions, the aid effectiveness debate has con-
sistently treated conflict as an external factor 
to be taken into account only at a much later 
stage in such analysis. Much of the litera-
ture on the economics of conflict and peace 
is concerned with the question of whether 
the existence of conflict or peace affects the 
growth rates of the economy. This, however, 
ignores the mechanisms through which a 
conflict affects economic performance and 
growth. Conflict countries are often treated 
as countries ‘subject to exogenous develop-
ments which take them outside the normal 
realm of analysis’ (Stewart et al. 2001: 2). By 
focusing on economic incentives as the main 
stimulants of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 
2000; 2004), mainstream economic analysis 
treats war as an essentially chaotic and irra-
tional eruption of violence. 
Neoclassical economics treats conflict as a 
temporary, exogenous factor, whose inten-
sity is measured by the number of battle-
related deaths, and which, in turn, is ‘too 
exceptional’ to deserve a separate frame of 
economic analysis. It is assumed that con-
flict implies a postponement of ‘normal’ 
economic activities, an abnormal operation 
of institutions, and a halt to the process of 
capital accumulation; therefore, any con-
crete economic analysis of the situation is 
postponed for the ‘post-conflict’ phase. Such 
a view, which tends to equate the cases of 
conflict and non-conflict countries, not only 
has an extremely limited explanatory power, 
but also gives little insight into the con-
text of the dynamic relations between con-
flict and economy. In line with this, donors 
often hurry, following the signing of a peace 
agreement, to define a conflict situation as 
‘post-conflict,’ since the latter allows them 
to implement their standard programmes 
(Taghdisi-Rad 2011). 
Shaky political agreements and unstable 
peace deals are taken as an end to conflict, 
despite the fact that violence and destruc-
tion might continue well after the signing of 
the peace deal, and that the economy might 
continue to suffer from the legacies of con-
flict for a considerable time after its official 
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end. Following the signing of the Oslo Peace 
Accords, much of the economic analysis of 
the oPt treated the situation as post-conflict. 
However, it was during this time that the 
Israeli policies of closure expanded through-
out the West Bank and the number of check-
points increased steadily. The newly created 
Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was 
also struggling to establish its legitimacy 
during this period. Yet, much of the litera-
ture analysed the Palestinian economy in 
this period based on the assumptions of an 
end to Israeli military incursions and inter-
ventions as well as re-instated Palestinian 
economic, political and government institu-
tions. These conditions clearly do not apply 
to the case of post-Oslo oPt, especially since 
the second Intifada.
Understanding the nature of the conflict 
and the ideological forces behind its contin-
uation are essential in order to construct a 
framework for the analysis of economic per-
formance under any given conflict. In order 
to assess the relevance and applicability of 
various economic policy options, including 
aid, in a conflict-affected country, it is cru-
cial to have a clear idea of the true socio-eco-
nomic costs that have been inflicted on the 
economy as a result of the conflict. Within 
the neoclassical economic approach, the 
cost of conflict has often been confined to its 
humanitarian costs – the number of battle-
related deaths per annum. It is according to 
this criterion that conflicts have been classi-
fied in terms of their ‘severity,’ and, in turn, 
been prescribed policy options. This meas-
ure does not represent the short-term and 
long-term social, economic, infrastructural 
and political costs of conflict. For instance, 
in the case of the oPt, as Tania Reinhart has 
demonstrated, the military policies of the 
Government of Israel are aimed at increas-
ing the number of injuries rather than 
deaths in order to minimise international 
pressure (Reinhart 2002). Such injuries 
can result in disability and loss of life-time 
employment which leads to reduction in 
incomes and an increase in poverty, but 
also means a long-term loss of Palestinian 
human capital, all of which needs to be 
taken into account in any analysis of the 
economic performance and labour market 
operations in the Palestinian territory.
It is important to acknowledge the ways in 
which economies are affected as a result of 
conflict and how this changes the behaviour 
and the role of economic agents including 
the state. The major changes in economic 
performance as a result of conflict come 
from destruction of capital, transport infra-
structure, international markets, fragmen-
tation or destruction of the labour-market, 
increased investment risk (and an increased 
liquidity preference), a reduction in foreign 
exchange reserves as a result of loss of export 
incomes, and an overall increase in transac-
tion costs which damage the developmen-
tal process of the economy. These are in 
addition to the micro- and meso-level eco-
nomic difficulties, which range from wide-
spread loss of entitlements and government 
expenditure moving away from economic 
and social spending towards conflict-related 
expenditures. Coming on top of fiscal con-
straints already triggered as a result of con-
flict-induced distortions to the tax system, 
for instance, all of this further intensifies the 
levels of poverty, increase in non-tradable 
and subsistence production, and the expan-
sion of the informal sector. These changes at 
various economic levels require new devel-
opmental approaches, increasing utilisation 
of local capacities and the ‘emergence of new 
forms of social capital,’ led by firm and con-
structive government action (Stewart et al. 
2001: 11).
Consideration of such economic changes 
can result in unexpected, non-mainstream 
policy choices. For example, in a conflict-
affected country, counter-inflationary meas-
ures can depress purchasing power and 
economic growth in an already-weak econ-
omy; privatisation can bring benefits only 
to a small elite of entrepreneurs; import 
liberalisation can intensify the process of 
conflict-induced capital flight; and deregula-
tion can reduce the power of a strong cen-
tral government needed to maintain stability 
Taghdisi Rad: Political Economy of Aid in ConflictArt. 22, page 6 of 18
and manage the process of primitive accu-
mulation. A transformed process of primi-
tive accumulation, which continues during 
the course of war and conflict, may result in 
difficult and unusual policy choices and out-
comes (Pugh et al. 2004). In this situation the 
informal economy, for example, may benefit 
the process of accumulation and develop-
ment in line with what Mark Chingono 
describes as being a ‘barefoot economy’ and 
a vibrant capitalism from below (Pugh et al. 
2004: 65). Controllers of black markets and 
other informal and even shadow economies 
may, given the right incentives and a secure 
environment provided by a strong state, 
contribute indirectly and through unfamil-
iar mechanisms to employment creation or 
provision of welfare structures and services 
which would benefit the neediest parts 
of the population – those left outside the 
reach of international agencies. An across-
the-board marginalisation of such informal 
groups can lead to a slow-down of the pro-
cess of primitive accumulation during the 
course of conflict.
When disbursed in the context of conflict 
and violence, aid becomes an inevitable part 
of that context; hence, its effects on conflict 
do not remain neutral. Aid can exacerbate 
the conflict if it is not well targeted, but it 
can also reduce the local severity of conflict 
by strengthening local capacities. As Sogge 
(2002) argues, aid managers are keen on 
demonstrating an apolitical image of aid, 
‘a branch of applied rationality inspired by 
humanitarianism…aid is supposed to be free 
of [the unfortunate] “impurities” spread 
by meddlesome non-professionals, such as 
politicians and NGOs’ (Sogge 2002: 113). 
Despite James Ferguson’s claim that the aid 
system is able to ‘suspend politics from even 
the most sensitive political operation’ and 
thus to operate as an ‘anti-politics machine,’ 
the record of donor interventions in global 
conflict settings prove otherwise (Sogge 
2002: 122). In 1989–90, when officials 
from Washington were assembling a new 
aid package for Yugoslavia, they may have 
believed that the conditions they demanded 
in exchange for aid were merely self-evident 
economic truths. Whatever their intentions, 
their prescriptions took no account of the 
fears Yugoslav citizens had about their live-
lihoods and well-being. Indeed, aid officials 
ignored clear warnings about the inflamma-
ble state of politics in the Balkans. Claiming 
‘apolitical intentions,’ they insisted on whole-
sale public sector cutbacks, mass sacking of 
enterprise workforces, reduced pay for the 
armed forces, and radical de-centralisation. 
Predictably, these policies helped trigger a 
violent backlash by ethnic-nationalist forces 
bent on breaking up the country. So began 
Yugoslavia’s descent into the abyss of war-
lord rule, upheaval and mass murder (Sogge 
2002: 113).
The aid effectiveness debate blames the 
ineffectiveness of aid on the lack of political 
transformation and state reform. This con-
cern with internal reform of the recipient 
country is in line with concerns with globali-
sation and international security, developed 
by major International Finance Institutions 
(IFIs) which follow the interest of selected 
Western governments, leading to a decline in 
the ownership of aid programmes and rais-
ing fundamental questions such as ‘accord-
ing to which principle and under whose 
authority’ are decisions made by the IFIs? 
(Macrae and Harmer 2004: 3). In addition, 
the increasing focus of the IFIs on prevent-
ing future conflicts, rather than eliminat-
ing the current ones, is an indicator of their 
unwillingness and inability to deal with the 
challenging environment facing countries 
already engaged in conflict and war. Such 
challenges, as stated before, are beyond the 
IFIs’ commitment to ‘universality of policy 
and uniformity of treatment’ (Macrae and 
Harmer 2004: 41).
Aid in the Palestinian territories
As the highest per capita recipient of non-
military aid worldwide for many consecutive 
years, one would expect the small economy 
of the oPt to be, at least, in ‘good shape’ 
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after more than 20 years of massive aid 
inflows. However, contrary to expectations, 
the Palestinian economy has deteriorated 
sharply since the emergence of donor pres-
ence in 1993. It is currently an undiversi-
fied economy, still heavily dependent on the 
Israeli economy and donor finance, a far cry 
from the post-Oslo stated donor objective of 
an independent Palestinian economy. The 
high levels of aid since the signing of the 
Oslo Accords were not sufficient to prevent 
the near collapse of the economy following 
the second Intifada (hereafter Intifada) in 
2001 when the territories were suddenly cut 
off from the world economy and had to func-
tion on their own. 
Entry of the donor community into the 
Palestinian political and economic arena 
coincided with the height of the neoclas-
sical Post-Washington Consensus (and the 
latter’s focus on ‘good governance’) in the 
1990s and its subsequent domination of 
the aid effectiveness debate. In addition, the 
Middle East peace process has always been 
of international strategic and geo-political 
importance to the countries associated with 
some of the largest active donors in the oPt, 
implying that the donor involvements in the 
Palestinian territories has had strong politi-
cal routes. From the World Bank’s 1993 pub-
lication of Investment in Peace, which became 
the blueprint for much of the donor alloca-
tion behaviour in the post-Oslo era, to the 
Paris Economic Protocol (PEP), as well as the 
choice of donor projects in the post-Intifada 
period, all indicate how the political agendas 
of donors and their associated governments, 
and not the economic needs of the recipi-
ent Palestinian economy, have determined 
the donor behaviour in the territories over 
the past 15 years. This vital aspect of donor 
involvement in the oPt supports the argu-
ment of this paper that not only does aid 
become a political tool by the fact of being 
disbursed in the politically-charged set-
tings of a conflict zone, but also, and more 
importantly, in the political context of con-
flict countries, donors’ political agendas 
inevitably determine their behaviour, pro-
grammes and policies.
Major macroeconomic indicators of 
the Palestinian economy
The post-Oslo years witnessed the weak-
est state of the Palestinian economy since 
the beginning of the occupation in 1967. 
During the period 1993–8, the cumulative 
total of financial donations to the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) was US$3.55 billion in pledges 
and US$2.45 billion in disbursement, yet 
GNP dropped by 3.4 per cent, 10.1 per cent 
and 2.9 per cent for the years 1993, 1995 and 
1996 respectively (Samara 2000: 6). After 
seven year of ‘peace,’ and five years after the 
establishment of the PA, per capita income 
in the West Bank and Gaza was estimated 
to be 10 per cent below the pre-Oslo levels. 
Despite considerable external assistance 
(almost US$4 billion for 1994–2000), liv-
ing standards were lower than before, while 
‘on a per capita basis and holding the prices 
constant, Palestinians [we]re estimated to 
be earning an average of 40 per cent less in 
2002 relative to 1999’ (Ajluni 2003: 66–7).
As demonstrated in the table below, the 
Intifada struck yet another powerful blow 
to the Palestinian economy, leading to sharp 
declines in domestic product as well as 
income levels. Comparing the pre-Intifada 
growth expectations with the actual figures, 
in constant 1997 prices, ‘the cumulative lost 
income-earning opportunities in the oPt 
during the first 27 months of the Intifada are 
estimated at US$4.8 billion, or more than 70 
per cent of what the GNI might have been in 
2002 in the no crisis scenario’ (Ajluni 2003: 
69). A direct result of decline in Palestinian 
employment in Israel as well as the intense 
closure of the oPt, this had wide implications 
for the levels and patterns of consumption in 
the territories. The Palestinian GDP declined 
by an estimated 12.9 per cent between 1999 
and 2004 (with per capita GDP declining by 
25.6 per cent during this period) (PCBS 2005: 
41). Per capita incomes also fell sharply, espe-
cially as the percentage of paid employees 
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and waged earners continued to fall among 
Palestinian workers, constituting 57.3 per 
cent of total workers in 2003 (MAS 2004: 9).
These developments have had a major 
impact on the structure of the economy, as 
demonstrated in Table 1 below, with sec-
tors such as agriculture, manufacturing and 
construction losing significance, while activi-
ties related to transportation experienced a 
surge. Apart from a general neglect of these 
sectors by donors and the PA, the decline in 
agriculture and industry may be attributed 
to a range of factors including lack of access 
to inputs and trade markets, and the decline 
in purchasing power of Palestinians.
The determinants of the economy: 
elements and legacies of prolonged 
conflict
The trends witnessed in the Palestinian 
economy are the outcome of the lega-
cies of Israel’s long-term occupation of the 
Palestinian territories as well as the realities 
of the conflict and oppression imposed on all 
aspects of Palestinian economy and society. 
Legacies of the conflict
The forced integrationist economic policies 
towards the Palestinian economy have been 
one of the dominant features of Israel’s occu-
pational policies over much of the last four 
decades. Israel opened its borders to trade 
and labour from the oPt following the 1967 
war, in an act often described as ‘imposed, 
impure, economic integration’ (Arnon 1997). 
This one-sided integration was combined 
with existence of heavy Israeli taxes (customs, 
income tax and Value Added Tax), license 
requirements for Palestinian producers and 
traders, as well as high levels of protection 
for Israeli producers and exporters. The post-
Oslo years demonstrated that despite an 
agreement, the Israeli government and its 
economic, political and military policies main-
tained, under the title of ‘interdependence,’ 
effective control over the economic affairs of 
the Palestinian territories. As Abed argues, 
this notion of interdependence ‘provide[d] 
a convenient euphemism to sweep under 
the carpet the notorious aspects of depend-
ence’ (1988: 260). By raising the transaction 
costs for Palestinian exporters through vari-
ous physical and regulatory barriers, and by 
hampering the possibilities of alternative 
destinations for Palestinian exports, the 
Israeli authorities undermined the competi-
tiveness and efficiency of Palestinian produc-
tion and export processes and ‘contained’ 
the Palestinian economy within controlled 
boundaries, denying it autonomous means of 
economic development.
Furthermore, by allowing Palestinians 
to ‘exercise sovereignty’ in their enclaves, 
the Israeli government maintained its con-
trol over them via asymmetric containment 
which would imply effective external control 
Economic Sectors 1999 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008*
Agriculture and fishing 10.4 9.9 7.9 7.1 5.2 5.6 5.6 4.6
Mining, manufacturing, 
electricity and water
14.5 15.2 17 17.1 17 15 13.8 13.6
Construction 13.7 2.3 5 5.7 6.8 7.2 6.2 4.9
Wholesale and retail trade 11 10.9 9.8 9.8 9.4 9.6 9.2 10.8
Transport 5.9 9.9 4.6 6.1 5.8 6.6 7.5 8.9
Other services 19.5 22.8 22.8 22.8 23 19.6 22.2 25.2
Public administration and 
defence
11 13.6 16.9 14.3 14.1 15.7 13.9 13.9
Table 1: Share of GDP by selected activities: remaining West Bank and Gaza Strip. Source: 
MAS: 2007, 2009.
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of Israel over these geographically isolated 
enclaves or bantustans7 that is the oPt today. 
Hence, even after withdrawals from some of 
the Palestinian territories, Israel still retains 
effective control over the mechanisms, pro-
cesses and strategic resources that shape the 
socio-economic life of the territories (for fur-
ther details see Taghdisi-Rad 2014). 
Elements of occupation 
The structural relations between the occupier 
and the occupied, and the gross asymmetries 
in power that attended it, were not disman-
tled but reinforced by the Oslo Accords. 
Post-Oslo has witnessed an expansion of set-
tlements, increased confiscation, fragmenta-
tion and cantonisation of Palestinian land, 
and the institutionalisation of the closure 
policies, all of which had devastating effects 
on the Palestinian economy. Ultimately the 
major flaw in the Paris Economic Protocol, 
and the Oslo process in general, was the fail-
ure to address the question of sovereignty 
that left an irreversible legacy for the econ-
omy of the oPt.
The intense Israeli-imposed systems of clo-
sures8 and movement restrictions9 coupled 
with settlement expansion has effectively 
stymied economic and commercial activities 
in the Palestinian localities, turning them 
instead into effective military zones. The long 
years of external and internal dispossession 
and fragmentation has deprived Palestinians 
of their national, collective, individual politi-
cal, social and cultural rights and freedoms, 
denying them sovereignty and self-determi-
nation, and the ability to develop structures 
and sectors in line with their national inter-
ests. This deep-rooted deprivation extends 
beyond their current rights and freedoms, is 
inter-generational in nature and goes well 
beyond mere economic dispossession. After 
all, economic dispossession only becomes 
possible following political and socio-cul-
tural dispossession, and it is the latter which 
explains the particularity of the Palestinian 
economic dependence on Israel. 
In this ‘dependence-cum-dispossession,’ a 
meaningful or even ‘dependent development’ 
is not possible, since Israel’s external-turned-
internal colonialism blocks capitalist trans-
formation which even mature capitalist 
industrial countries claim to promote in their 
relations with the developing countries (Abed 
1988). The elements and legacies of the con-
flict are the fundamental factors shaping the 
economic, political and social relationships 
between the occupier and the occupied in 
the Palestinian territories, resulting in a weak 
and deteriorating economy with poor devel-
opment prospects. Therefore, for develop-
ment aid or any other external intervention 
to have any impact on the economies of the 
territories, they need to target these eco-
nomic weaknesses and conflict-related obsta-
cles to development, as well as the causes of 
these weaknesses and obstacles. 
Aid allocation patterns in the oPt
Since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, 
large sums of money have been pledged 
by both bilateral and multilateral donors, 
with the aim of assisting the peace process 
and the ‘post-conflict’ reconstruction in the 
Palestinian territories. This objective has, of 
course, been subject to change due to the 
volatile nature of the political scene in the 
region, particularly since the second Intifada. 
Yet, nearly two decades since their initial 
involvement, donors are still present in the 
oPt but their objectives and activities are very 
different from those of the early 1990s. 
The largest donors to the territories since 
Oslo have been the European Community 
(EC), the United States, Saudi Arabia, and 
the European Union countries as a group. In 
the pre-Intifada period, the two large bilat-
eral donors, namely the United States and 
the United Kingdom, dominated the donor 
scene. However, following the Intifada, the 
EC has dominated the scene, while the US 
has maintained second place. Compared 
to only 1.5 per cent in the early 1990s, by 
2003–4 the EC allocated more than 2.2 per 
cent of its total aid worldwide to the oPt. 
For the US, by 2003–4, the oPt was receiv-
ing 1.2 per cent of its total foreign assis-
tance (DAC 2007).
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During the pre-Intifada period, annual 
donor disbursements averaged around 
US$500 million (or US$150 per capita). At 
the onset of the second Intifada, this figure 
doubled to around US$1 billion per annum 
in 2001 and 2002, and at US$500 per capita, 
the donor disbursement in the West Bank 
and Gaza became the highest sustained rate 
of per capita disbursements to an aid recipi-
ent in the world since the Second World 
War (World Bank 2004: 64). The post-Oslo 
construction efforts and the hopes associ-
ated with the creation of an independent 
Palestinian economy led many donors to 
concentrate on post-conflict development 
assistance (see for example, World Bank 
2004a, 2004b). However, over the years, reg-
ular (development) support has been increas-
ingly replaced by short-term humanitarian 
aid and budget support, as demonstrated in 
the Table 2 above. 
The primary concern and target of most 
donor activities for most of the 1990s was 
‘development’ assistance and construc-
tion of much-needed infrastructure in the 
Palestinian economy. This was based on 
the belief that economic development was 
vital for the establishment and consolida-
tion of peace. Furthermore, it was believed 
that by creating backward and forward link-
ages, local employment opportunities, and 
encouraging local as well as international 
trade and investment, a strong infrastructure 
could be of enormous importance to the 
Palestinians economy. However, this sector 
has received decreasing donor attention in 
the post-Intifada period: from 22.3 per cent 
of total pre-Intifada assistance to less than 
10 per cent of total post-Intifada assistance 
(DSP 2004: 127). During the pre-Intifada 
period, areas such as budget support to the 
Palestinian National Authority (PNA), gender 
and youth support constituted a very small 
proportion of total commitment and dis-
bursement as seen in Table 3 below.
In the post-Intifada period, however, these 
priorities were replaced by new ones. Table 
4 provides a detailed account of donors’ 
post-Intifada activities in the oPt. This period, 
which witnessed a shift in donor attitude 
and focus from development to institution-
building and governance reforms, combined 
with both the limited capacity of donors 
facing strict Israeli measures and obstacles 
and also the near collapse of the Palestinian 
economy and budget, shaped a new set of 
donor priorities. These priorities were not 
in line with the needs of the Palestinian 
economy, but rather more in line with the 
ideological developments underlying donor 
thinking and operations in the late-1990s, 
namely the Post-Washington Consensus. In 
line with the latter’s emphasis on the role 
of the recipient government institutions in 
determining the impact of aid, this period 
witnessed mounting pressure on the PA to 
undergo wide-ranging reforms, even though 
these very donors were behind the design of 
the PA institutions only a few years earlier. 
Powerless in the face of the Intifada and the 
questions and challenges it posed to donor 
activities, Palestinian institutional reform 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005
Regular (development) support 667 692 852 473 261 326 450
Emergency and budgetary support 0 0 121 755 1,266 1,078 850
Total commitment 667 692 973 1,228 1,527 1,404 1,300
Total disbursements 419 482 549 929 1,026 883 N/A
Table 2: Donor Commitments and disbursements, 1998–2005 (US$ million). Source: Adapted 
from World Bank (2004: 65), undated using MoP Database, 2007.
Note: These exclude support to UNRWA’s regular budget.
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suddenly became the new game in town as 
it provided donors with a means of survival 
and presence in the territories. 
As a result, the share of development 
assistance dropped from 28 per cent of 
total international aid to only 26 per cent 
after 2000 – see Table 5. Within the cat-
egory of development assistance, the share 
of productive sectors declined from 14 per 
cent to 9 per cent after 2000. Sectors such 
as the agricultural sector, despite their criti-
cal cushioning role in the face of worsen-
ing economic crisis received a meagre 1 per 
cent of total international support (UNCTAD 
2004: 9).
Much of what remained and was catego-
rised as development assistance during the 
post-Intifada period has been, in fact, emer-
gency assistance in infrastructure and social 
sectors, especially health. Donor assistance 
towards budget support increased from 
2.6 per cent of total assistance before the 
Intifada to more than 40 per cent in the fol-
lowing period. The main sources of the boost 
in budget support are the EC, the World 
Bank, and the Arab donors.
Institution-building and capacity-build-
ing (human rights, civil society, and democ-
racy) also witnessed a doubling of budgets. 
Such institution-building projects included 
support for the Palestinian judicial sys-
tem, reform of the tax system, Palestinian 
NGO projects, strengthening parliamen-
tary democracy, and civil service reforms. 
Sectors Total 
Committed 
Total Disbursed Disbursement 
as percentage 
of Commitment
Agriculture 28,520,362 14,870,389 52
Budget Support 4,635,000 4,381,211 95
Education 114,779,769 89,310,207 78
Employment generation 2,232,000 10,704,387 480
Energy 86,465,560 79,440,278 92
Gender 11,133,366 5,187,156 47
Health 68,190,086 61,110,180 90
Human Rights /Civil Society /Democracy 118,619,815 73,091,456 62
Humanitarian Aid 68,325,199 45,765,059 67
Infrastructure 290,083,841 188,468,059 65
Institution-building 156,966,418 85,074,006 54
Multiple Sector 80,736,668 29,600,902 37
Private Sector Development 150,693,301 61,166,560 41
Solid Waste 21,681,968 9,560,921 44
Support to UNRWA 16,163,309 33,418,830 207
Tourism & Cultural Resources 27,261,839 24,695,559 91
Water and Sanitation 380,058,221 230,835,336 61
Youth 9,826,083 7,519,825 77
GRAND TOTAL 1,636,372,807 1,054,200,321 64
Table 3: Pre-Intifada sectoral allocation of grants and loans to the WBGS, 1994–2000. Source: 
MoP database, 2007.
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Increasing donor attention to such projects 
could be justified in ‘normal’ circumstances; 
however, given the nature of the Palestinian 
economy and the conflict-related con-
straints it faces, such policies and projects 
are far less capable of achieving sustainable 
economic and social development in the 
Palestinian context.
A comparison between the allocation pat-
terns before and after the Intifada reveals 
the inconsistencies between donors’ secto-
ral allocations and the emerging needs of 
Sectors Total 
Committed 
Total Disbursed Disbursement 
as percentage of 
Commitment
Agriculture 31,072,735 30,516,091 98
Budget Support 1,449,641,295 1,458,610,006 101
Education 222,711,009 89,133,165 40
Employment generation 185,748,448 74,290,189 40
Energy 283,241,624 39,308,404 14
Gender 13,867,740 7,985,260 58
Health 186,194,585 94,888,064 51
Human Rights /Civil Society /Democracy 305,582,588 152,355,992 50
Humanitarian Aid 226,754,783 177,682,447 78
Infrastructure 370,574,322 258,206,518 70
Institution-building 356,337,300 231,464,686 65
Multiple Sector 132,291,606 96,088,137 73
Private Sector Development 148,821,630 95,665,881 64
Solid Waste 38,264,001 15,653,642 41
Support to UNRWA 1,093,834,981 1,054,230,036 96
Tourism & Cultural Resources 41,953,927 25,247,827 60
Water and Sanitation 388,495,753 215,306,666 55
Youth 37,615,266 6,922,161 18
GRAND TOTAL 5,513,003,594 4,123,555,172 75
Table 4: Post-intifada sectoral allocation of grants and loans to the WBGS, 2000–2006. 
Source: MoP database, 2007.








Share in total 
(in per cent)
Development 930.5 465.2 88.1 1163.2 290.8 28.4
Emergency 99.0 49.5 9.4 1186.0 296.5 29.0
Budget support 24.2 13.6 2.6 1742.1 435.5 42.6
Total support 1056.6 528.3 100.0 4091.2 1022.8 100.0
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the Palestinian economy, particularly after 
the Intifada. As mentioned earlier, after the 
Intifada, agriculture became a major shock 
absorber for the Palestinian economy, and 
its share in domestic employment increased 
from 12.6 per cent in 1999 to almost 16 per 
cent in 2004. However, this important sector 
received marginal attention from the donor 
community, its share in development assis-
tance reached a low of 0.4 per cent in 2002, 
only increasing to 2 per cent in 2004. Similar 
trends, although of less intensity, can be seen 
in the case of the manufacturing sector. As 
UNCTAD argues, these inconsistencies were 
already a feature of donors’ sectoral alloca-
tion before 2000, but became even more 
apparent after the switch to emergency 
and relief assistance following the Intifada 
(UNCTAD 2006: 38).
In addition, this increased budget support 
was combined with increasing donor influ-
ence on internal Palestinian budgetary deci-
sion-making and a wide range of economic 
and political conditionalities. The latter were 
justified on the basis of the economic ortho-
doxy that warned of the dangers of corrup-
tion at the receiving end.10 This was despite 
the fact that, as Le More highlights, in 
August 2004 the European Anti-Fraud Office 
announced that there had been ‘no evidence 
that the EU non-targeted budget assistance 
was used to finance illegal activities, includ-
ing the financing of terrorism’ – this conclu-
sion was reaffirmed in their 2005 assessment 
(Le More 2008: 148). Nevertheless, driven by 
the fear of being blamed for financing illegal 
activities through their non-targeted budget 
support, donors established the Public 
Financial Management Reform Trust Fund in 
2004, which was a multi-donor budget sup-
port mechanism administered by The World 
Bank. The Reform Trust Fund would disburse 
budget support against a series of reform 
benchmarks to be fulfilled by the PA.
In most cases, where the priorities and 
interests of donors do not correspond with 
the Palestinian development agenda and 
concerns, instead of taking the latter on 
board, donors have used their financial and 
political leverage to co-opt and coerce the 
domestic institutions into adopting donors’ 
priorities and agendas, to the extent that the 
state becomes accountable to donors and not 
its own citizens. As stated clearly by Moore et 
al., ‘rather than have the state controlled by 
common people, [donors] would control the 
local state’s withdrawal from the economy . . 
. tak[ing] resources away from the state and 
plac[ing] in the “market,” where all citizens 
will supposedly have equal access to them’ 
(Moore and Schmitz 1995: 17). This has been 
used to justify donors’ notion of ‘interna-
tional state,’ while using neoliberalism as ‘a 
form of governmentality’; an intervention, 
which at best deprives the recipient coun-
try from ownership of policies and donor-
induced projects, and at worst, is a form of 
‘recolonisation’ of the developing countries 
(Moore and Schmitz 1995: 17).
Although effective in providing some (and 
not even the neediest) Palestinian families 
with temporary relief and preventing the 
total collapse of the government budget, the 
donor shift towards budget and humanitar-
ian support did not incorporate any devel-
opmental priorities and was not linked to 
any long-term strategic development plans 
for the future of the Palestinian economy. 
Although justified in its own rights, the 
increasing focus of donors on institution-
building in the oPt was untimely because the 
real obstacles to the economic development 
of the oPt were not weak institutions but the 
intensifying occupation-related elements 
which donors refused to deal with. Therefore, 
although potentially effective under ‘normal’ 
circumstances, in the context of the oPt’s 
conflict-affected economy these institutional 
reforms in the areas of trade, finance, law and 
civil society, were far less capable, compared 
to other productive sectors such as agricul-
ture and industry, of achieving sustainable 
economic and social development.
In brief, by ‘working around’ the conflict, 
the actual donor behaviour on the ground 
does not take into account the forces of 
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conflict even after the outbreak of the Intifada 
and intensification of the conflict elements. 
By failing to incorporate such significant 
considerations in donor programmes and 
projects, these programmes and projects 
fail to address the needs and weaknesses of 
the Palestinian economy and their origins, 
while creating a state of aid dependency and 
making the Israeli occupation less costly and 
more sustainable.
The ‘de-development’11 of the Palestinian 
economy during the post-Oslo years and 
donors’ failure to recognise this process, 
have illustrated the ‘futility of pursuing 
economic development in the absence of a 
viable political agreement’ (Roy in Keating et 
al. 2005: 201). Economic growth and devel-
opment are unlikely to precede political 
stability. Understanding the special nature 
of dispossession and dependency that the 
Palestinian economy has experienced over 
the prolonged period of occupation is an 
essential pre-requisite for any successful 
economic policy-making. This calls for a 
departure from frameworks that attempt to 
separate the politics of occupation from the 
economic realities of the Palestinian territo-
ries, confining the former to a brief descrip-
tive footnote. 
The refusal of the international donor 
agencies to exert any pressure on the Israeli 
government to end the occupation, choosing 
instead to work around it, has in fact only 
strengthened the elements of occupation, 
such as bantustanisation, which are respon-
sible for the devastation of the Palestinian 
economic fabric. Donors have helped render 
the Israeli occupation less costly and, hence, 
more sustainable by focussing on provision 
of basic services inside the oPt and other pro-
jects with little or no developmental linkages 
to other sectors of the Palestinian economy, 
by exhausting the Palestinian resources due 
to high levels of conditionality and lack of 
donor co-ordination, and by creating a state 
of aid dependency in the oPt. 
Even the ‘humanitarian’ activities of 
donors, although important in preventing 
a humanitarian catastrophe in the occupied 
territories have enabled ‘Israel to impose a 
deluxe occupation in the West Bank – total 
military domination with no responsibility 
for running the life of the occupied popu-
lation, and no price tag attached’ (Le More 
2008: 128). Donors’ rush to set up ‘recon-
struction’ and ‘rehabilitation’ programmes 
following each wave of Israeli military 
destructions in the oPt has not only helped 
to maintain the Israeli ‘deluxe’ occupation, 
but has also reduced the sense of urgency 
for a political settlement to the conflict, 
which is vital for any meaningful and effec-
tive economic recovery. In addition, aid has 
provided an avenue through which donors 
have supported a weakening peace process, 
and, by so doing established a role for them-
selves (see Taghdisi-Rad 2011 and 2012). An 
American official’s analogy in this regard is 
refreshing, ‘the Peace process was like a bicy-
cle. Even if you pedalled slowly you had to 
move. Otherwise you fell over. Aid agenda 
has given other third-party actors the leeway 
to continue to “pedal”’ (Le More 2008: 11). It 
is this which explains much of donors’ ‘cri-
sis management’ approach to the conflict: 
‘focusing on day-to-day problem solving and 
the latest peace move or plan (“new game in 
town”),’ thereby, ‘keeping the “peace process” 
alive politically, and most importantly their 
role within it’ (Le More 2008: 15). 
Concluding remarks
This paper argues that the workings of aid in 
conflict zones is determined by a combination 
of donors’ political, diplomatic and ideologi-
cal interests and alliances. At the macro-level, 
political interests, strategic alliances, and 
quest for diplomatic survival dictates the 
general direction of donor assistance. These 
political agendas manifest themselves in the 
ideological and economic frameworks and 
activities adopted or supported by donors 
at the micro, project level. Such policies and 
projects in the oPt have not only undermined 
Palestinian development prospects and ter-
ritorial integrity but have normalised the 
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occupation and reduced the urgency for a 
political settlement to the conflict.
The neoclassical framework, as reflected in 
the aid effectiveness debate, is far too limited 
to incorporate a comprehensive understand-
ing of the interaction between conflict and 
the economy. Shaped by these ideological 
leanings and rigid frameworks donors pro-
jects are unable to effectively deal with the 
fact of conflict and its many complex inter-
actions with the economy. This, however, 
enables ‘hassle-free’ donor involvement 
in conflict zones, providing them with the 
required international diplomatic creden-
tials while relieving them of any responsibil-
ity and accountability for reproducing the 
economic and developmental outcomes of 
conflict. This, therefore, explains why after 
more than 22 years of massive aid flows into 
the oPt, donor assistance has failed to achieve 
any viable developmental outcomes, leaving 
the Palestinian economy in a constant state 
of crisis and collapse. 
The failure of foreign aid in conflict- 
affected zones such as the oPt can no 
longer be explained by the failures of the 
recipient government to effectively imple-
ment donor-prescribed reforms. The highly 
political nature of donor interventions in 
conflict-affected countries mean that even a 
reshaping of donor programmes may not be 
sufficient since competing political and ide-
ological interests will inevitably impede not 
only the effectiveness of aid but the pros-
pects of ending the conflict itself. This high-
lights the importance of a viable political 
settlement to the conflict as a precondition 
for effectiveness of any aid and develop-
ment agenda. 
Notes
 1 See, for example, Anderson 1996.
 2 This was mainly based on the Harrod-
Domar model which envisioned the role 
of foreign capital in minimising the sav-
ings gap in the economy. In this model 
the assumed excess supply of labour 
means that economic development 
is dependent on the levels of capital, 
which is the scarce factor of production. 
According to this framework, ‘aid should 
continue not until a certain income level 
is reached in underdeveloped countries 
but only until those countries can mobi-
lize a level of capital formation sufficient 
for self-sustaining growth’ (Rosenstein-
Rodan 1961: 107).
 3 Including Griffin (1970); Griffin and Enos 
(1970); Rahman (1968); and Weiskopf 
(1972).
 4 Later studies showed that aid has, in 
fact, an insignificant impact on saving 
rates. The two-gap model developed by 
Chenery and Strout (1966) argued that a 
country will receive aid either because it 
suffers from savings or foreign exchange 
gap, and that the effect of foreign aid will 
differ depending on which gap is binding 
in that country.
 5 It argued, through econometric cross-
country analysis, that aid will be effective 
only if it is disbursed in a ‘good’ financial, 
trade and fiscal policy environment.
 6 For example, Easterly, Levine and Roodman 
(2003), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), 
Hansen and Tarp (2001), Dayton-Johnson 
and Hoddinott (2003), Guillaumont and 
Chauvet (1999), and Beynon (2001).
 7 The term Bantustan was first used in 
the context of South Africa under the 
Apartheid regime, where it referred to 
‘an area designated by the South African 
government as the native country of a 
given tribe of blacks’ aimed at reducing 
their presence in the ‘white areas’ while 
declaring the Bantustans as ‘independ-
ent’ states (Hunter 1986: 53).
 8 Closures, which intensified during the 
post-Oslo years, were both internal (within 
the oPt, including between the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip) and external (between 
Israel and the oPt, and international cross-
ings to the Gaza Strip). These became 
tighter following the introduction of the 
‘Operation Defensive Shield’ by the Israeli 
Defence Forces (IDF) in 2002.
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 9 Essentially an extensive and dense net-
work of fixed and mobile, temporary 
and permanent checkpoints and border 
crossings.
 10 The financial pressures as well as pres-
sure from the pro-Israeli lobby felt by the 
donors, particularly the EU as the second 
largest contributor to the Palestinian 
budget support, are also salient factors in 
this regard.
 11 A term coined by Sara Roy (1995) that 
refers to the ‘deliberate, systematic 
destruction of an indigenous economy by 
a dominant power.’
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